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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a mythical question, well described by Duarte, Longstaff and Yu (2006), 
whether fixed-income arbitrage strategies are truly arbitrage or merely strategies that 
earn small positive returns most of the time, but occasionally experience dramatic 
losses. The question can be  summarized in the anecdote “picking up nickels in front 
of a steamroller”. This master’s thesis studies two of these specific fixed-income 
arbitrage strategies: Swap Spread Arbitrage and Yield Curve Arbitrage. 
Duarte, Longstaff and Yu (2006), studied this question for five fixed-income 
arbitrage strategies in their article “Risk and Return in Fixed-Income Arbitrage: 
Nickels in Front of a Steamroller?”. However, they used data from November 1988 
until December 2004, so they analyzed these strategies over a period which included 
one major global financial crisis, the global financial crisis of 1998. My hypothesis is 
that their conclusions on executing Swap Spread and Yield Curve arbitrage strategies 
from 1988 until 2004, saying that these strategies are profitable, for instance, will not 
hold when also the 2008 global financial crisis is taken into account. 
The research method used in my master’s thesis is based on gathering data from 
trustworthy commercial and academic sources, developing and simulating 
mathematical models for the fixed-income arbitrage strategies and finally making the 
linear regression analysis of their returns controlled by an eighteen-factor-list. 
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and Duarte, Longstaff and Yu (2006) used similar 
approaches; however, the approach of regressing returns to the eighteen-factor-list 
was inspired on the work of Hannu Kahra (2011). 
The main hypothesis is that the global financial crisis of 2008 had a big impact on 
these strategies return indexes. This proved to be wrong. These two fixed-income 
arbitrage strategies seem profitable on the long run even under financial crisis cycles. 
In order for a reader to understand the subject of this master’s thesis, some basic 
concepts and definitions will be introduced at appendix 1. 
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After this introductory chapter, I will move on to the main hypothesis of this work 
and the methodology used to obtain the results. Specific data descriptions, their 
sources and some assumptions on the data are also described in chapter 2.  
Next, both arbitrage strategies on the scope of this master’s thesis, i.e. swap spread 
arbitrage strategy and yield curve arbitrage strategy, are described in detail in 
chapters 3 and 4 respectively. For each of these strategies, there is first a detailed 
description on how the strategy works, including some graphics which visually 
depict the strategy and the arbitrage opportunities. Also, some numeric examples are 
provided to enhance the understandability of the text explaining the strategies. For 
each of these strategies’ descriptions, details on the transaction costs, the valuation 
procedure to present value of return indexes and their normalization by adjusting 
them to a fix annualized volatility of 10% are also described. Figures with the results 
for each of the strategies with data from both Bloomberg™ and Thompson Reuters 
Datastream™ are presented. In appendices 2 and 4, tables with results for each of 
these strategies with data from both Bloomberg™ and Thompson Reuters 
Datastream™ are presented. 
The conclusions from the results of each strategy are presented both separately and in 
contrast with the main hypothesis in chapter 5. A linear regression analysis is done in 
order to find a possible α for the strategies, as well. Appendices 7, 8, 9 and 10 
present the linear regression analysis results. A final conclusion using all results is 
also laid out in chapter 5. 
In appendix 3, there is a thorough deduction of the two-factor affine model. It takes 
some degree of intellectual capital to obtain the model. In appendix 4, a high level 
description of the structure of the over thousand five hundred lines of R language 
based coding created during this master’s thesis is provided. Finally, all references to 
academic and non-academic sources are listed.  
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2. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Hypothesis 
My hypothesis is that the conclusions for executing swap spread and yield curve 
arbitrage strategies from 1988 until 2004, which include only the global financial 
crisis of 1998, will not hold when also the 2008 global financial crisis is taken into 
account. 
If confirmed, at least from the perspective of swap spread and yield curve arbitrage 
strategies, this hypothesis may give more arguments to the affirmation “fixed-income 
strategies just earn small positive returns most of the time, but occasionally 
experience dramatic losses”, however if not confirmed, more arguments towards the 
assertion “these two fixed-income arbitrage strategies seem profitable on the long run 
even under financial crisis cycles” can be laid out. 
2.2 Methodology 
At subchapters 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 the gathering data part of the research method is 
presented. For the part of the research method concerned on developing and 
simulating mathematical models for  the fixed-income arbitrage strategies, appendix 
4 describes in high level R language based coding logic and appendix 2 deducts the 
two-factor affine model required for the yield curve arbitrage strategy. Other details 
on the implementation of the strategies are described on the respective strategy 
chapter. 
Concerning making the linear regression analysis of their returns controlled by an 
eighteen-factor-list part of the research method, there is a specific subchapter at 
chapter 5, called risk adjusted returns, where the details of the linear regression 
analysis are listed. 
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2.2.1 Arbitrage strategies data description 
The data used in this master’s thesis was gathered from difference sources such as 
Bloomberg™, Federal Reserve System (FED) and Thompson Reuters Datastream™. 
The month-end-date data series obtained from the FED website 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/) were the one-year, two-year, three-year, five-year, 
seven-year and ten-year Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT) rates. 
The data series obtained from Bloomberg™ and Thompson Reuters Datastream™ 
terminals at the Oulu Business School at the University of Oulu were (note: all of 
these rates are based on end-of-trading-day):  
• Three-month Libor month-end-date rates 
• One-year, two-year, five-year, seven-year and ten-year midmarket 
Constant Maturity Swap (CMS) rates 
• Three-month general collateral repo rates 
First, I ran an R-language based coding, which I developed myself, on the data until 
December 2004, which includes the 1998 global financial crisis. After that, I ran it 
again but then using data until December 2011, which includes the 1998 and 2008 
global financial crises. 
When both results were available (i.e. until 2004 and until 2011), comparison could 
be made and the final conclusions were summarized in chapter 5. 
Some bits of data were neither available from Bloomberg™ nor from Thompson 
Reuters Datastream™. I therefore had to make some assumptions and 
approximations in order to proceed with the master’s thesis analysis. 
Firstly, the one-year maturity CMS monthly rates were not available from 
30.11.1988 until 31.5.1996. We know there is correlation between different maturity 
12 
yield curves, so taking the difference between the monthly one-year maturity CMS 
and the two-year maturity CMS rates from 28.06.1996 until 30.12.2011 I got the 
following statistics: mean = 0.2791 and standard deviation = 0.3116. 
With the premise that I didn’t have access to other commercial data bases such as 
Citigroup™, which was used for instance by Duarte, Longstaff and Yu (2006) to 
obtain such data, for the sake of simplicity, I assumed the one-year maturity CMS 
monthly rates from 30.11.1988 until 31.5.1996 to be equal to the two-year maturity 
CMS rates (form the same time span) minus 0.2791.  This approach is reasonable 
since the two-year maturity CMS yields on such period were between 4% and 10%. 
Also other approaches could have been made. One example of such would be to find 
a least residuals ARMA model for monthly rate differences from 28.06.1996 to 
30.12.2011 and simulate, based on this ARMA model, the one-year maturity CMS 
monthly rate from 30.11.1988 until 31.05.1996. 
Secondly, similarly to the one-year maturity CMS monthly rates, the three-month 
general collateral repo monthly rate was available only from 29.10.1999 onwards. 
The market for generalized collateral (GC) repo agreements began in January 1996. 
GC repos became a more satisfactory indicator of expectations of future interest rates 
after March 1997. Prior to this date the only available short maturity assets we could 
use would be Treasury bills. Therefore I assumed that from 30.11.1988 until 
29.10.1999, the three-month CMT monthly rates represent a very good estimation of 
the three-month general collateral repo monthly rates in the same period. 
Obviously another valid approach would have been to start the whole arbitrage 
strategies analysis from 29.10.1999 onwards; however, I didn’t take this approach 
because the idea was to generate a tool to analyze both arbitrage strategies through 
the global financial crisis of 1998 and of 2008. Once such data for the one-year 
maturity CMS monthly rates (up to 31.5.1996)  and three-month general collateral 
repo monthly rate (up to 29.10.1999)  are available from other commercial databases, 
these assumptions above can be revoked, the R-language coding generated during the 
master’s thesis can be easily re-executed and the results re-analyzed. 
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2.2.2 Linear regression analysis data description  
The data for the regression analysis was gathered from diverse sources.  
I used the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) database from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis to assemble the monthly data for: TWEXMMTH, AAA, 
TB3MS, BAA, GS30, TP30A28 and CPF3M.  
Data series obtained from Thompson Reuters Datastream™ were gathered for: 
MSUSUAM, MSWXUS, MSEMKF, USMGUSRI, USMGEXRI, ECUSD1M, 
GOLDBLN, BMUS30Y, JPUS3ML, MSVWLD$, MSGWLD$, MSSAWF$, 
MSLAWF$, BMUS10Y and SP500.  
The data for the three-month Euro- Dollar deposit rate (EDM3) was gathered from 
the FED economic and research data H15 database, three-month Eurodollar deposits 
(London), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm , which cite the 
sources as  Bloomberg and CTRB ICAP Fixed Income & Money Market Products. 
MOM, the average of the returns on two (big and small) high prior return portfolios 
minus the average of the returns on two low prior return portfolios returns, or in 
other words  the Fama and French momentum factor  was obtained from Kenneth 
French at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
For more details and the descriptions of the indexes listed above, please see appendix 
3. 
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3. SWAP SPREAD ARBITRAGE STRATEGY 
As Duarte, Longstaff and Yu (2006) described, the swap spread arbitrage strategy is 
composed of two legs. Firstly an arbitrageur enters into a par swap and receives a 
fixed coupon rate CMS and pays the floating Three-month Libor. Secondly the 
arbitrageur shorts a par Treasury bond (CMT) with the same maturity as the CMS 
and invests the proceeds on a margin account earning the three-month general 
collateral repo rate, i.e. the arbitrageur pays the fixed coupon rate of the Treasury 
bond CMT and receives three-month general collateral repo rate from the margin 
account. 
For the cash flow from the combination of the two legs, we have the arbitrageur 
receiving fixed annuity SS = CMS - CMT and paying floating spread S = Libor – 
Repo. Likewise, we will later on realize that also the opposite strategy will need to be 
implemented. For such, the cash flow is the arbitrageur paying fixed annuity SSo = 
CMS - CMT and receiving floating spread So = Libor – Repo.   
In short, the swap spread arbitrage strategy is the bet on whether the fixed annuity 
(SS) or the floating spread (So) received will be larger than the floating spread (S) or 
the fixed annuity (SSo) paid respectively, on a monthly basis.  
Figure 1 below depicts the three-month floating spread versus swap spread for two, 
three, five, seven and ten years maturity. They show arbitrage opportunities. 
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Figure 1: Three-month floating spread versus swap spread for 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years 
maturity. 
To construct the return index, we determine for each month from November 1988 to 
December 2011, whether the current swap spread differs from the current value of 
the short term spread. If the difference exceeds a trigger value of 10 basis points, we 
implement the trade for a $100 notional position (receive fixed on a $100 notional 
swap, short a $100 notional Treasury bond, or vice versa if the difference is less than 
-10 basis points). If the difference does not exceed the trigger, then the strategy 
invests in cash and earns an excess return of zero. We keep the trade on, until it 
converges (i.e.  the swap spread converges to the short term spread) or until the 
maturity of the swap and Treasury bond. 
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Let me illustrate this strategy with one small example. For instance, let’s take the 3 
years maturity swap.  Assuming we are on the closing of November 1988,  the swap 
spread is the CMS minus CMT, in this case 9.48% - 8.72% =  0.76 %, or in other 
words 76 basis points. The respective short term spread is three-month Libor minus 
three-month repo rate, i.e. 9.31% - 8.03% = 1.28% or 128 basis points. The 
difference is then 76 – 128 = -52 basis points, which is less than -10 basis points, so 
we will implement the trade for a $100 notional position. This means we will receive 
on a $100 notional on the floating, i.e. $1.28  and pay fixed on a $100 notional swap, 
i.e. $0.76 plus the transactions costs of this transaction ($ 0.1103125, see more 
details on the assumptions for the transactions costs on the next paragraph), therefore 
profiting $0.4096875, in this case. In terms of excess return this means 0.4097% - 
7.76% /12 = -0.23697%. We will keep this trade on, until it converges, i.e. the swap 
spread converges to the short term spread or until the maturity of the swap and bond. 
On the next month, December 1988, we would start a new trade if the difference 
exceeds the 10 basis points trigger (or is less than -10 basis points) and the return 
index is the equally weighted average of the returns of the two trades so far. Every 
month we repeat this process, ending up with multiple trades each month. Note that 
when the respective swap matures, the trade cease to exists, therefore there will be a 
range from zero to 36 trades in any given month for the 3-year maturity Swap 
strategy, from which the equally weighted average of the returns of these trades 
make the return index for that month for the swap spread arbitrage strategy. 
The return index calculation from the swap spread arbitrage strategy takes into 
account transaction costs in initializing or termination positions, such costs are 
assumed to be relatively large in comparison to those paid by large institutional 
investors such as major fixed income arbitrage hedge funds, so that those estimated 
transaction costs can be assumed as conservative and realistic. I assumed 1 basis 
point for the swap bid-ask spread, 10 basis point for the Repo bid-ask spread and 
1/32 of basis points for the Treasury bond bid-ask spread similarly as Duarte, 
Longstaff and Yu (2006). For the valuation of the return index to present value, the 
cash flows for the return index for each month were discounted by the respective 
monthly TB3MS rates from that respective month until December 2011. 
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To have the possibility of the data comparison with Duarte, Longstaff and Yu 
(2006)’s results, I also adjusted the return index to a fix annualized volatility of 10%.  
The figure 2 below, depicts the return indexes for the swap spread arbitrage 
strategies with  two, three, five, seven and ten years maturity, as well as the equally 
weighted portfolio on all these returns. 
 
Figure 2: Return indexes for the swap spread arbitrage strategies with  2, 3, 5, 7 and 
10 years maturity as well as the equally weighted portfolio on all these returns. 
18 
 
Figure 3: Relative performance of each swap spread arbitrage strategy in relation to 
the equally weighted portfolio. 
In appendix 5, tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the summary statistics for the monthly 
percentage excess returns of swap spread arbitrage strategies with CMS data from 
Bloomberg
TM
 and from Thompson Reuters Datastream™, until 2004 and until 2011 
respectively. Those summary statistics were obtained with R-package 
PerformanceAnalytics. 
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4. YIELD CURVE ARBITRAGE STRATEGY 
Duarte, Longstaff and Yu (2006) describe yield curve arbitrage strategy as a strategy 
based on taking long and short positions at different points along the yield curve. It 
often takes the form of a ‘‘butterfly’’ trade, for instance an arbitrageur may go long 
on the five-year CMS and short one-year and ten-year CMS. 
Firstly, an analysis is applied to identify points along the yield curve, which are 
either ‘‘rich’’ or ‘‘cheap”, i.e. “rich” means higher price than the analysis valuation 
model indicates and “cheap” means lower price than the analysis model indicates.  
Secondly, the arbitrageur enters into a portfolio that exploits these perceived 
different valuations by going long and short CMS in a way that minimizes the risk of 
the portfolio. 
Finally, the portfolio is held until the trade converges (or twelve months matures) 
and the relative values of the CMS come back in line with the analysis valuation 
model. 
Here I assume that the term structure of the analysis valuation model is determined 
by a two-factor affine model.  We then fit the model to match exactly the one-year 
and 10-year points along the CMS curve each month. 
The model is defined in the following way: 
We assume that the riskless rate is given by           , where           follow 
the dynamics 
                      (4.1) 
                     (4.2) 
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under the risk-neutral measure, where    and    are standard uncorrelated (ρ = 0) 
Brownian motions. 
I demonstrate in appendix 2 that the riskless rate can be described as: 
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With the model (4.3) defined, we compute deviations between market valuation and 
the model valuation for the two- , three-, five- and seven-year CMS rates. 
For the sake of validating the used data and affine fitted model, let’s visualize the 
difference between the market swap rates for the indicated horizons and the 
corresponding values implied by the two-factor affine model fitted to match exactly 
the one-year and 10-year swap rates. 
In figure 4 below, we have such differences in basis points: 
 
Figure 4: Difference between the market swap rates for the indicated horizons and 
the corresponding values implied by the two-factor affine model fitted. 
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Now we just need to determine which of those valuation differences are either 
‘‘rich’’ or ‘‘cheap”, and then implement the ‘‘butterfly’’ trade.  
Let’s have one illustrative example as well; taking seven-year CMS rate on 31st 
November 1988, we get 9.68%, whereas the affine model valuation gives: 
                                  
    0.0157476 
       0.9612305 
       10.5700621 
      0.2965492 
       -1.3996613 
                    0.9612305*10.5700621 +0.2965492*(-1.3996613) 
              
So, based on the affine model valuation we can conclude that the market seven-year 
CMS rate on 31st November 1988 is “cheap”, because it is 8 basis points below the 
fitted model valuation, so we will implement the following “butterfly” strategy: 
going short (paying fixed) $100 notional of seven-year CMS and going long a 
portfolio of one-year and 10-year CMS with the same sensitivity to the two affine 
factors as the seven-year CMS. Once this “butterfly” trade is put on, it is held for 12 
months or until the market seven-year CMS rate converges to the model valuation.  
The same process would continue for each month, with either a trade similar to the 
above, the reverse trade of the above, or no trade at all (in which case the strategy 
invests in cash and earns zero excess return).   
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Unlike the swap spread strategy, yield curve strategy involves a high degree of 
‘‘intellectual capital’’ to implement both the process of identifying arbitrage 
opportunities and the associated hedging strategies require the application of a multi-
factor term structure model. 
Similarly to the swap spread arbitrage strategy, the return index calculation for this 
arbitrage strategy takes into account transaction costs in initializing or termination 
positions, such costs are assumed to be relatively large in comparison to those paid 
by large institutional investors such as major fixed income arbitrage hedge funds, so 
that those estimated transaction costs can be assumed as conservative and realistic. I 
assumed 1 basis point for the swap bid-ask spread, 10 basis points for the Repo bid-
ask spread and 1/32 of basis point for the Treasury bond bid-ask spread. 
For the valuation of the return index to present value, the cash flows for the return 
index for each month were discounted by the respective monthly TB3MS rates from 
that respective month until December 2011. 
To have the possibility of the data validation with Duarte, Longstaff and Yu (2006)’s 
results, I also adjusted the return index to a fix annualized volatility of 10%.  
The five figures below depict the return indexes for the yield curve arbitrage 
strategies with  two, three, five and seven years maturity, as well as the equally 
weighted portfolio on all these returns. 
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Figure 5: Yield curve arbitrage strategies with 2, 3, 5 and 7 years maturity, as well as 
the equally weighted portfolio on all these returns. 
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Figure 6: Relative performance of each yield curve arbitrage strategy in relation to 
the equally weighted portfolio. 
At appendix 6, tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the summary statistics for the monthly 
percentage excess returns of yield curve arbitrage strategies with CMS data from 
Bloomberg
TM
 and from Thompson Reuters Datastream™, until 2004 and until 2011 
respectively. Those summary statistics were obtained with R-package 
PerformanceAnalytics. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Risk adjusted returns 
In order to analyze whether the returns obtained are just a reward to market risks or 
have any significant α, I regressed the excess returns for the two strategies to an 
eighteen-factor-list. The list came from the twenty-factor list suggested by Hannu 
Kahra (2011). The eighteen-factor used on the regression analysis are described in 
appendix 3. 
The linear regression analysis was based on the following equation:  
 
Return - Rf = α + β1MSUSAM + β2MSWXUS + β3MSEMKF+ β4USMGUSRI 
+ β5USMGEXRI + β6ECUSD1M + β7GOLDBLN + β8TWEXMMTH + 
β9CREDITaaa + β10CREDITbaa + β11TED + β12TERM + β13VALGRTH + 
β14SMLG + β15MOM + β16VIX + β17INF + β18FINANCE 
The linear regression analysis, for each return series, was done by starting with all 18 
factors and removing one by one, the one with t-statistics < 1.98 and t-statistics  > -
1.98 and the smallest absolute t-statistics value. Each time one factor was removed, 
the analysis was re-executed using R function “lm” for fitting linear models. 
The quantitative results are laid out in appendices 7, 8, 9 and 10. The qualitative 
results from the analysis of those appendices, however, brought me to the conclusion 
that, assuming a 95% confidence level and data from 1988 to 2011 from 
Bloomberg
TM
, there are no significant αs for the swap spread arbitrage strategy 
excess returns and based on the coefficient of determination R
2
, from 40% to 72% of 
these excess returns can be explained with the regression factors. Intuitively, the 
swap spread arbitrage strategy has a significant amount of market risk, and the 
excess returns are simply compensation for bearing that risk. 
Different qualitative results, however, can be concluded for the yield curve arbitrage 
strategy excess returns. These have, assuming a 95% confidence level and data from 
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1988 to 2011 from Bloomberg
TM
, significant αs, ranging from -3.22% up to 4.74%. 
Apparently these can be a consequence of a higher degree of “intellectual capital” 
required to implement the process of identifying the arbitrage opportunities with the 
use of an affine two-factor term structure model. Therefore yield curve arbitrage 
strategy appears to produce significant risk-adjusted excess returns. A drawback on 
those results nevertheless is the fact that only 9% to 19% of these excess returns can 
be explained with the regression factors, leading to a likely conclusion that better 
regression factors need to be found. 
In summary, I have qualitatively obtained the same results as Duarte, Longstaff and 
Yu (2006) for these two fixed-income arbitrage strategies.  Quantitatively, for the 
yield curve arbitrage strategy excess returns, based on the equally weighted portfolio, 
my results are roughly 2 times more than the results from Duarte, Longstaff and Yu 
(2006), and for the swap spread arbitrage strategy excess returns, my results are 
roughly half. This quantitative discrepancy is likely due to three main reasons: data 
assumptions for the repo until 29.10.1999, data assumptions for the one-year 
maturity CMS until 31.5.1996 and for the fact that Duarte, Longstaff and Yu 
(2006)’s study was until 2004 comparing to those above until 2011.  
5.2 Swap spread arbitrage strategy 
With CMS data from Bloomberg
TM
 and strategy horizon until December 2004, table 
1 shows that the mean monthly excess returns range from -2.29 % to +1.4 %. It is 
worth noting that most of the means of the strategies, forSS2, SS3, SS5, SS7 and 
SS10 are significant at the 5% level, since t-statistics for these are greater than 1.98 
or smaller than -1.98. However, for SSEW the mean is significant only at the 10% 
level, since t-statistics is less than -1,658.  
All the skewness coefficients for the returns distributions have negative values; in 
other words, the tail on the left side of the probability density function is longer than 
the tail on the right side and the bulk of the values lie to the right of the mean. 
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Figure 7: Diagrams illustrating negative and positive skew. 
Source: Adapted from Rodolfo Hermans (2008) 
Five of the distribution of returns for SS strategies (SS3, SS5, SS7, SS10 and SSEW) 
have excess kurtosis, i.e. more than the normal distribution kurtosis which equals to 
3. This leads to the conclusion that those distributions have heavy tails. 
The Sharpe Ratio calculates how well the return of an investment compensates the 
investor for the risk taken, or, in other words, measures the excess return per unit of 
risk (here standard deviation). The higher the Sharpe Ratio, the better return for the 
same risk is provided by the strategy. As shown in table 1, all distribution of returns 
for all SS strategies have negative Sharpe Ratios, ranging from -0.0079 to -0.1692. 
The equally weighted (SSEW) portfolio strategy has smaller volatility since the 
returns of the individual strategies (SS2, SS3, SS5, SS7 and SS10) are not perfectly 
correlated, which therefore provides considerable diversification. 
Now analyzing with CMS data from Bloomberg
TM
 and strategies horizon until 
December 2011, table 2 shows that the mean monthly excess returns range from -
1.74 % to +1.93 %, i.e. essentially the same range as obtained for the 2004 horizon. 
It is worth noting, however, that the means of the SS2, SS5, SS7, and SS10 strategies 
are significant at the 5% level, since t-statistics is greater than 1.98 (or smaller than -
1.98). For SS3 and SSEW, the mean is not significant even at the 10% level, since 
those t-statistics are -0.289 and +1.363, which are more than -1.658 and less than 
1.658 respectively. 
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Similarly, the skewness coefficients for the returns distributions have negative 
values. Only the kurtosis of SS5 (5.583) is greater than three. 
Sharpe Ratios for the strategies horizon until December 2011 were different than the 
ones for the horizon until December 2004. SS2 and SS3 had positive Sharp Ratios   
of 0.0067 and 0.0112 respectively. In absolute terms, the Sharpe Ratio of SS5, SS7 
and SS10 are approximately half of the Sharpe Ratios for the horizon until December 
2004; or in other words less excess return per unit of risk. 
As above, the equally weighted (EWSS) portfolio strategy provides considerable 
diversification. 
For the sake of making also the SS strategy analysis with data from Thompson 
Reuters Datastream™, tables 2 and 3 depict the results of the SS strategies with time 
span until December 2004 and until December 2011 respectively. Very similar 
conclusions as above can be made from those results as well. One result is worth 
mentioning, the t-statistics for the equally weighted portfolio SSEW for the horizon 
until December 2011; with mean of 0.31% and t-statistics of 2.1875, makes the mean 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Finally, we can conclude that, for SS strategies SS5, SS7 and SS10 with CMS data 
from both Bloomberg
TM 
and from Thompson Reuters Datastream™ databases, the 
2008 global financial crisis did not have a significant impact on the results of the 
returns. Some impact was visible for the SS2 and SS3, as the means of their excess 
returns with data until 2004, -2.4% and -0.49% were in absolute terms much greater 
than the equivalent with data until 2011, -1.74% and -0.05%.  
5.3 Yield curve arbitrage strategy 
With CMS data from Bloomberg
TM
 and strategy horizon until December 2004, table 
5 shows that the mean monthly excess returns range from +1.08 % to +2.66 %. It is 
worth noting that all of the means of the strategies (YC2, YC3, YC5, YC7 and 
EWYC) are significant at the 5% level, since t-statistics for these are greater than 
1,98.  
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Some of the skewness coefficients for the returns distributions of YC strategies   
have negative values (YC2 and YC3), which means that the tail on the left side of the 
probability density function is longer than the tail on the right side and the bulk of 
the values lie to the right of the mean which suggests there are more positive returns 
than negative returns. YC5, YC7 and YCEW have positive skewness coefficients, 
which suggest that for these strategies there are more returns to the left of the means, 
i.e. smaller than the mean or negative returns. 
Only YC2 has more kurtosis than a normal distribution, so its excess return 
distribution has heavy tails. All the other YC strategies have less kurtosis than the 
normal distribution, so they have only modestly sized deviations on the tails.  
The Sharpe Ratios for all YC strategies distribution of returns are negative and 
ranging from -0.0012 to -0.0053. 
Equally weighted (YCEW) portfolio strategy provides considerable diversification as 
its standard deviation is only 59.2% of that of the individual strategies which are 
2.89%. 
Now with CMS data from Bloomberg
TM
 and strategy horizon until December 2011, 
table 6 shows that the mean monthly excess returns range from +1.25 % to +2.61 %, 
i.e. essentially the same range as obtained for the 2004 horizon. It is worth noting, 
however, that all of the means of the strategies are significant at the 5% level, since t-
statistics for these are greater than 1.98. 
Exactly as for the horizon until 2004, some of the skewness coefficients for the 
returns distributions of YC strategies have negative values (YC2 and YC3), which 
means that the tail on the left side of the probability density function is longer than 
the tail on the right side and the bulk of the values lie to the right side of the mean 
which suggests there are more positive returns than negative returns. As well as for 
the horizon until 2004 YC5, YC7 and YCEW have positive skewness coefficients, 
what suggests that for these strategies there are more returns to the left side of the 
means, i.e. smaller than the mean or negative returns. 
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YC2 and YC3 strategies distribution of excess returns have more kurtosis than the 
normal distribution, which leads to the conclusion that YC2 and YC3 have heavy 
tails comparing to the normal distribution but the other YC strategies (including the 
equally weighted) distribution of excess returns don’t have heavy tails.  
The Sharpe Ratios for YC strategies distributions of excess returns are ranging from -
0.0008 and -0.0036. 
Equally weighted (EWYC) portfolio strategy provides considerable diversification as 
its standard deviation is only 60.2% of that of the individual strategies. 
For the sake of making also the YC strategy analysis with data from Thompson 
Reuters Datastream™ , tables 7 and 8 depict the results of the YC strategies with 
time span until December 2004 and until December 2011 respectively. There are 
some minor differences in the results. The ones worth noting are the YC3 (2004) 
skewness of 0.2860 and equivalent YC3(2011) skewness of 0.4456, YCEW (2004) 
skewness of -0.0644 and equivalent YCEW(2011) skewness of 0.1434, YC3 (2004) 
kurtosis of -0.2226 and equivalent YC3(2011) kurtosis of 0.5047. The Sharpe Ratios 
from 2004 and 2011 series, on the other hand, are roughly the same.  
Finally, we can conclude that for YC strategies with CMS data from both 
Bloomberg
TM 
 and from Thompson Reuters Datastream™ databases, the 2008 global 
financial crisis did not have a significant impact on the results of the excess returns. 
This means that my hypothesis is wrong, because the results with or without the time 
period including the 2008 global financial crisis are very similar. 
5.4 Possible continuation 
Here I list possible new topics which could be considered if one would like to 
continue this study. 
Two new factors could be added to the linear regression analysis, as proposed by 
Hannu Kahra (2011), QUALITY and SAFETY. QUALITY is the dynamic 
correlation between US benchmark 10 year ds govt. index return (BMUS10Y) and 
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composite S&P 500 index return.  SAFETY is the dynamic correlation between spot 
gold London morning fixing (GOLDBLN(UF)) unofficial price changes and 
composite S&P 500 index returns.  
Portfolio optimization theory could be used, instead of using equally weighted 
portfolios. Test for unit root in the residuals of the regression analysis could improve 
the results. The yield curve arbitrage strategy could be scrutinized further, for 
instance by finding out new regression factors. As a new cost, hedge fund 
management fees could be modeled and considered, for instance 2/20 , since these 
arbitrage strategies are mainly used by hedge funds.  
5.5 Final considerations 
Based on both swap spread arbitrage strategy and yield curve arbitrage strategy 
results, I concluded that the hypothesis that the 2008 global financial crisis would 
have a significant impact on the results is not correct. 
These arbitrage strategies seem profitable on the long run, even under financial crisis 
cycles, which shows some robustness since the data used on this master’s thesis was 
collected over the span of 24 years. 
Interestingly, the yield curve arbitrage strategy excess return index provided fatter 
profit and α, apparently as a consequence of its higher degree of “intellectual capital” 
required to implement the process of identifying the arbitrage opportunities with the 
use of an affine  two-factor term structure model. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 – Basic concepts 
It is necessary to understand some basic concepts and definitions in order to 
understand the text in this master’s thesis. I’ve listed here, not exhaustively though, 
the most important concepts and definitions. 
FED (The Federal Reserve System) is the central bank of the United States. It was 
founded by Congress in 1913 to provide the nation with a safer, more flexible, and 
more stable monetary and financial system. Over the years, its role in banking and in 
the economy has expanded. Today, the Federal Reserve’s duties fall into four general 
areas:  
• conducting the nation’s monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit 
conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates  
• supervising and regulating banking institutions to ensure the safety and soundness 
of the nation’s banking and financial system and to protect the credit rights of 
consumers  
• maintaining the stability of the financial system and containing systemic risk that 
may arise in financial markets  
• providing financial services to depository institutions, the U.S. government, and 
foreign official institutions, including playing a major role in operating the nation’s 
payments system. 
Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
According to the Federal Reserve System, CMS (Constant Maturity Swap) are the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA®) mid-market par swap 
rates. Rates are for a Fixed Rate Payer in return for receiving three month LIBOR, 
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and are based on rates collected at 11:00 a.m. Eastern time by Garban Intercapital plc 
and published on Reuters Page ISDAFIX®1. ISDAFIX is a registered service mark 
of ISDA. 
The yields on Treasury nominal securities at “constant maturity” are interpolated by 
the U.S. Treasury from the daily yield curve for non-inflation-indexed Treasury 
securities. According to the Federal Reserve System, this curve called CMT 
(Constant Maturity Treasury), which relates the yield on a security to its time to 
maturity, is based on the closing market bid yields on actively traded Treasury 
securities in the over-the-counter market. These market yields are calculated from 
composites of quotations obtained by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The 
constant maturity yield values are read from the yield curve at fixed maturities, 
currently 1, 3, and 6 months and 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, and 30 years. This method 
provides a yield for a 10-year maturity, for example, even if no outstanding security 
has exactly 10 years remaining to maturity. 
As defined by the Federal Reserve System, LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) 
is a reference interest rate published by the British Bankers' Association (BBA). The 
BBA surveys a panel of major banks daily and asks each bank to provide the interest 
rate at which it believes it could borrow funds unsecured in a particular currency and 
for a particular maturity in the wholesale money market in London. The published 
rate is a trimmed average of the rates obtained in the survey. 
According to Duffie Darell and Kenneth J. Singleton (2003), affine process is a 
jump-diffusion process for which the drift vector, the instantaneous covariance 
matrix, and the jump-arrival intensities all have affine (constant-plus-linear) 
dependence on the current state of vector Xt. Prominent among affine processes in 
the term-structure literature are Gaussian and square-root diffusion models of 
Vasicek (1977) and Cox el al. (1985), respectively. Affine processes allow for a wide 
variety, such as stochastic volatility, jumps and correlations among the elements of 
the state vector Xt. 
According to Duffie Darell and Kenneth J. Singleton (2003), an asset SWAP is a 
derivative security that can be viewed, in its simplest version, as a portfolio 
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consisting of a fixed-rate note and an interest-rate swap of the same notional amount 
that pays fixed and receives floating, say LIBOR, to the stated maturity of the 
underlying fixed-rate note. At the origination of the asset SWAP, the fixed rate of the 
interest-swap component is chosen so that the market value of the asset SWAP is 
equal to the face value of the underlying note. We can also view the interest rate 
SWAP as one that pays fixed-rate coupons at a rate equal to the coupon rate C on the 
underlying fixed-rate SWAP and receives floating-rate coupons at a rate equal to 
LIBOR plus some fixed spread, say S. 
According to Taylor Stephen (1986, pages 13–14), financial prices and hence returns 
are determined by many political, corporate and individual decisions. A model for 
prices or returns is a detailed description of how successive prices or returns are 
determined. They say that the description contains enough detail to be called a model 
if it can be used to simulate prices or returns. A good model will be capable of 
providing simulated prices or returns which look like just like real prices or returns. 
For such a model, if we gave someone a long series of real prices (from an un-named 
market) and an equally long series of simulated prices, then the person could only 
guess which of the two series was real. Thus, a good model must describe all the 
known properties of recorded prices or returns. Models can be constructed using 
concepts from statistics, economics and other sciences. Models can be conjectured 
from data or they can be suggested by economic theory. Any model will only be an 
approximation to the rules which convert relevant information and numerous beliefs 
and actions into market prices.  
As stated by Mark Fisher (2002), a repurchase agreement, or repo, can be thought of 
as a collateralized loan. The collateral will be Treasury securities (that is, Treasury 
bills, notes, and bonds). At the inception of the agreement, the borrower turns over 
the collateral to the lender in exchange for funds. When the loan matures, the funds 
are returned to the lender along with interest at the previously agreed-upon repo rate, 
and the collateral is returned to the borrower. Repo agreements can have any 
maturity, but most are for one business day, referred to as overnight. From the 
perspective of the owner of the security and the borrower of funds, the transaction is 
referred to as a repo while from the lender’s perspective the same transaction is 
referred to as a reverse repo, or simply a reverse. For most publicly traded U.S. 
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Treasury securities, the financing rate in the repo market is the general collateral 
rate (which can be thought of as the risk-free interest rate). In contrast, for some 
Treasury securities — typically recently issued securities — the financing rate is 
lower than the general collateral rate. These securities are said to be on special, and 
their financing rates are referred to as specific collateral rates, also known as special 
repo rates. The difference between the general collateral rate and the specific 
collateral rate is the repo spread. 
According to Bruce Tuckman and Angel Serrat (2012), a repurchase agreement or 
repo is a contract in which a security is traded at some initial price with the 
understanding that the trade will be reversed at some future date at some fixed price. 
In effect, a repurchase agreement is a collateralized loan with the seller handing over 
the security as collateral. 
As stated by Adam Kobor, Lishan Shi and Ivan Zelenko (2005), the swap spread , or 
the price of swaps relative to Treasuries, cannot be captured in a pricing formula but 
results instead from joint equilibrium of bond and swap markets. Due to their wide 
use, swap spread and their fluctuations have a decisive impact on some of the most 
essential financial operations. For an issuer of bonds based on the LIBOR 
systematically swapping its debt into floating at issuance, the relative evolution of 
the swap spread versus its own spread against Treasuries will result in its final 
funding costs as measured against the LIBOR curve (or swap curve).  
According to Robert Dubil (2004), governments, financial, and non-financial 
corporations raise debt funds by borrowing from financial institutions, like banks, or 
by issuing securities in the financial markets in order to finance their activities. 
Securities are distributed in the primary markets and they are sold directly from 
borrowers to investors, sometimes with the help of an investment bank. They are 
traded among investors in the secondary markets. Securities’ markets can be, in 
general, divided into money and capital markets. Money market instruments are 
those whose maturities are less than one year. Capital markets’ instruments are those 
whose maturities are more than one year. This division is largely artificial and due to 
different legal requirements. The spot markets for debit securities, also called fixed 
income securities, are markets where debt contracts typically have a stated maturity 
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date and pay interest defined through a coupon rate or a coupon formula.  Examples 
of fixed income securities are: corporate and government bonds, interest rate swaps,  
U.S. Treasury Bills (T-Bills), U.S. federal agency discount notes, Fed Funds, 
repurchase agreements (repo), Eurocurrency deposits, commercial papers and 
Certificates of Deposit (CD). 
According to Robert Dubil (2004), arbitrage is defined in most text books as 
riskless, instantaneous profit. It occurs when the law of one price, which states that 
the same item cannot sell at two different prices at the same time, is violated. The 
same stock cannot trade for one price at one exchange and for a different price at 
another, unless there are fees, taxes, etc. If it does, traders will buy it on the exchange 
where it sells for less, and sell it on the one where it sells for more. More 
complicated pure arbitrage involves forward and contingent markets. It can take a 
static form, where the trade is put on at the outset and liquidated once at a future date 
(e.g. trading forward rate agreements against spot LIBORs for two different terms), 
or a dynamic one, in which the trader commits to a series of steps that eliminate all 
directional market risk and ensures virtually riskless profit on completion of these 
steps.   
According to Siddhartha Jha (1984), the yield curve is mathematically the set of 
yields as a function of time; the yield curve can be thought of as a “machine” that 
takes time to maturity as an input and outputs the yield for a bond of that maturity. 
The yield curve can also be thought of as the price of lending (borrowing) money 
over different points in time.  As rates markets have matured, the presence of 
investors such as hedge funds that are more nimble in their investments and can take 
advantages of mispricing across the yield curve makes segmentation (certain investor 
classes preferring to invest in certain maturity ranges) unlikely as a major source of 
yield differences. In sum, the yield curve is likely a mix of market expectations as 
well as some risk aversion, while certain niche sectors may feel the effects of 
segmentation.  
According to Tzong-shian Yu and Dianqing Xu (2001), the financial crisis of 1998 
first broke in Thailand on July 2
nd
, 1997, and swept the region like a tornado, 
engulfing Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore, and encroaching upon 
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Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan and China. No country in East Asia managed to 
completely evade its impact. One year later (1998), the far-reaching effects of the 
economic storm had still not died down in East Asia, and they had spread even to 
Russia and Latin America. All the countries that succumbed to the crisis found 
themselves facing a sharp depreciation in their currencies and collapse of stock 
market; these effects had in turn resulted in a decline in exports, a slowdown in 
economic growth and a rise in unemployment. 
According to Amitendu Palit (2010), the financial crisis of 2008 was in several ways 
a crisis due to globalization. The globalized modern world had not experienced a 
crisis of this magnitude before. The Asia meltdown of 1997 was an event which was 
confined to Southeast and Northeast Asia. The latest crisis, however, took on a much 
greater geographical shape. Although it began as a ‘trans-Atlantic’ crisis, it soon 
spread rapidly to various parts of the world, including Asia. This happened on 
account of the substantial links that the world had developed through financial 
globalization channels of trade and banking. Thus, the crisis was largely interpreted 
as a catastrophe arising from the close interconnectedness of financial and 
commercial systems which successfully transmitted  the damage from its core to the 
periphery. 
According to the R Project for Statistical Computing (source: http://www.r-
project.org/), R is a language and environment for statistical computing and graphics. 
It is a GNU project which is similar to the S language and environment which was 
developed at Bell Laboratories (formerly AT&T, now Lucent Technologies) by John 
Chambers and colleagues. R can be considered as a different implementation of S. 
There are some important differences, but much code written for S runs unaltered 
under R. R provides a wide variety of statistical (linear and nonlinear modeling, 
classical statistical tests, time-series analysis, classification, clustering...) and 
graphical techniques, and is highly extensible. The S language is often the vehicle of 
choice for research in statistical methodology, and R provides an Open Source route 
to participation in that activity. One of R's strengths is the ease with which well-
designed publication-quality plots can be produced, including mathematical symbols 
and formulae where needed. Great care has been taken over the defaults for the 
minor design choices in graphics, but the user retains full control. R is available as 
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Free Software under the terms of the Free Software Foundation's GNU General 
Public License in source code form. It compiles and runs on a wide variety of UNIX 
platforms and similar systems (including FreeBSD and Linux), Windows and 
MacOS. 
According to the Unicode Consortium, basis point = 1 per myriad = one one-
hundredth percent = percent of a percent = 1‱ = 0.01% 
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Appendix 2 – Deduction of the two-factor affine model 
The model is defined in the following way: 
We assume that the riskless rate is given by           , where           follow 
the dynamics 
                  (ap3.1) 
                  (ap3.2) 
under the risk-neutral measure, where    and    are standard uncorrelated (ρ = 0) 
Brownian motions. 
Looking at the dynamics above, we realize this is a two-factor Vasicek model, which 
has the following dynamics 
                      
    (ap3.3) 
                      
 
  (ap3.4) 
Where: 
   and    are the speed of mean reversion for factors X and Y, respectively. 
   and     are long run average for factors X and Y, respectively. 
   and    are volatility for factors X and Y, respectively. 
   
 and    
 
are random shocks to factors X and Y, respectively. 
44 
   
 and    
 
 are correlated with correlation coefficient ρ, but since we assume 
these are standard uncorrelated Brownian motions, ρ = 0.  
The spot rate for the two factor Vasicek model, as described at Simon Babbs (1993), 
is 
r(T) =    + 
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)     (ap3.5) 
One of the primary problems with multi-factor models is that we typically do not 
observe the factors, X and Y.  
On the other hand, if we take two zero coupon bonds with maturities T1 and T2, the 
yields, Y1(t) and Y2(t) of the two bonds are related to the unobserved factors as 
follows: 
Y1(t) = A1 +     X(t)+    Y(t)    (ap3.6) 
Y2(t) = A2+    X(t)+      Y(t)     (ap3.7) 
where A1, A2,      ,      ,      and      can be recovered from the expression above 
for the spot rate (ap3.5) as follows: 
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We can now solve (ap3.6) and (ap3.7) for X(t) and Y(t) using the standard technique 
for solving two linear equations with two unknowns; but before that, let’s assume 
that the Y1(t) is the one-year CMS and Y2(t) is the 10-year CMS, respectively 
                       
                                          (ap3.8) 
                                        (ap3.9) 
Multiplying (ap3.8) by        and (ap3.9) by       , we have:  
                                                            (ap3.10) 
                                                       (ap3.11) 
Adding (ap3.10) to (ap3.11) we have: 
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    (ap3.12) 
Now multiplying (ap3.8) by -                          , we have: 
-                                                        (ap3.13) 
                                                         (ap3.14) 
Adding (ap3.13) to (ap3.14) we have: 
                        
                                               
      
                                    
               
    (ap3.15) 
Based on (ap3.15) and (ap3.12), finally we can build the affine model as 
    
                                      
                   
   
 
                                    
               
   (ap3.16) 
Returning to the definitions of A1, A2,      ,      ,      ,      , comparing (ap3.1), 
(ap3.2), (ap3.3) and (ap3.4) and making the correct analogies, we have: 
        ; 
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      ; 
      ; 
       ; 
     ; 
       
According to Duarte, Longstaff and Yu (2006), using the global minimum squared 
difference method for the differences between the model and market values for the 
two-, three-, five- and seven-year CMS rates, the resulting parameters estimates are  
  = 0.0009503,   = 0.0113727,   = 0.0548290,    0.0240306,   = 0.4628664 and 
   0.0257381. This lead me to the following estimates for                    
                                                          and   = 
0.0257381. 
With those parameters I could easily calculate A1 = 0.0102472, A10 = -0.0017207, 
     = 0.9943345,      = 0.8004968,        0.9452316 and       = 0.2139348.
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Appendix 3 – Eighteen risk factors used for the regression analysis 
1. MSUSAM: MSCI North American Equities [Datastream series MSUSAM$(RI)]. 
Source: THOMSON REUTERS DATASTREAM. 
2. MSWXUS: MSCI non-US Equities [Datastream series MSWXUS$(RI) ]. Source: 
THOMSON REUTERS DATASTREAM. 
3. MSEMKF: MSCI Emerging Market index monthly total return [Datastream series: 
MSEMKF$(RI)]. Source: THOMSON REUTERS DATASTREAM. 
4. USMGUSRI: JPMorgan US Government Bonds [Datastream series USMGUSRI]. 
Source: THOMSON REUTERS DATASTREAM. 
5. USMGEXRI: JPMorgan non-US Government Bonds [Datastream series 
USMGEXRI ]. Source: THOMSON REUTERS DATASTREAM. 
6. ECUSD1M: One-month Eurodollar deposit rate of the previous month 
[Datastream series ECUSD1M ]. Source: THOMSON REUTERS DATASTREAM. 
7. GOLDBLN: Unofficial price for spot gold London morning fixing [Datastream 
series GOLDBLN(UF) ]. Source: THOMSON REUTERS DATASTREAM. 
8. TWEXMMTH: Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Major Currencies. Source: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TWEXMMTH  
9. CREDITaaa: Difference between Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield 
(AAA) and 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate (TB3MS). Source: FED: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/AAA and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TB3MS/ 
10. CREDITbaa: Difference between Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield 
(BAA) and 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate (TB3MS). Source: FED: 
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http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BAA and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TB3MS/ 
11. TED: Difference between 3-Month Euro- Dollar deposit rate (EDM3)  and 3-
Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate (TB3MS). Source: FED: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm , Bloomberg, CTRB ICAP 
Fixed Income & Money Market Products and  
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TB3MS/. 
12. TERM: Difference in returns on the total return US Treasury 30-Years index 
(BMUS30Y(RI)) and the total return US Treasury Bill 3-Month index (JPUS3ML). 
Source: Ang, Goetzmann and Schaefer (2009) and THOMSON REUTERS 
DATASTREAM. 
13. VALGRTH: Difference in returns between global "value" stocks ((MSVWLD$) 
and global "growth" stocks (MSGWLD$) computed using MSCI world indices. 
Source: Ang, Goetzmann and Schaefer (2009) and THOMSON REUTERS 
DATASTREAM. 
14. SMLG: Difference in returns between global small cap stocks (MSSAWF$) and 
global large cap stocks (MSLAWF$) computed using MSCI all country indices. 
Source: Ang, Goetzmann and Schaefer (2009) and THOMSON REUTERS 
DATASTREAM. 
15. MOM: Fama and French momentum factor. Difference in returns between US 
stocks with past high returns and US stocks with past low returns. The momentum 
factor is constructed from six value-weight portfolios formed using independent sorts 
on size and prior return of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. Mom is the average 
of the returns on two (big and small) high prior return portfolios minus the average of 
the returns on two low prior return portfolios.  The portfolios are constructed 
monthly.  Big means a firm is above the median market cap on the NYSE at the end 
of the previous month; small firms are below the median NYSE market cap. Prior 
return is measured from month -12 to - 2.  Firms in the low prior return portfolio are 
below the 30th NYSE percentile.  Those in the high portfolio are above the 70th 
50 
NYSE percentile. Source: Ang, Goetzmann and Schaefer (2009) and Kenneth French 
at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html . 
Copyright 2012 Kenneth R. French 
16. VIX: VOLATILITY S&P500 (^VIX) - Chicago Options. Source: 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=^VIX 
17. INF: Difference between 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (GS30) and 
30-Year 3-5/8% Treasury Inflation-Indexed Bond (TP30A28). Source: FED: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GS30 and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TP30A28  
18. FINANCE: Difference between 3-Month AA Financial Commercial Paper Rate 
(CPF3M) and  3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate (TB3MS). Source: 
FED: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPF3M  and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TB3MS/ 
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Appendix 4 – R language based coding 
I developed R-language based coding for the purpose of implementing the Swap 
Spread and Yield Curve arbitrage strategies for this master’s thesis. Approximately 
one thousand and five hundred lines of R code were developed. 
I use R version 2.14.2 (2012-02-29), copyright (C) 2012 The R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, Platform: x86_64-pc-mingw32/x64 (64-bit). 
R language based coding logic was split in 4 main parts: loading R-packages and 
generic data, swap spread strategy specific, yield curve strategy specific and generic 
functions. 
For the loading R-packages and generic data part, the following R-packages were 
needed: fBasics, timeSeries, FinTS, quantmod, fUnitRoots, sde, termstrc, chron, 
tseries, boot, graphics, graphicsQC, dse, PerformanceAnalytics and xts. There were 
txt format files from where the data described at chapter 2.2 methodology. 
The swap spread strategy specific part implements the strategy for the set of swap 
maturities, but paying attention to bringing the results to present values, i.e. 
discounted with a monthly variable risk free rate from the TB3MS, and normalizing 
returns to an annualized 10% volatility.  
Similarly, the yield curve strategy specific part implements the strategy for the set of 
swap maturities, but besides paying attention to bringing the results to present values 
and normalizing returns to an annualized 10% volatility, also the two-factor affine 
model is developed in this part of the code. 
The main generic function of my R language based code is the regression analysis.  
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Appendix 5 – Summary statistics for swap spread arbitrage strategy 
For all tables on appendix 5, the following applies: 
‘Observations’ refer to the number of observations. ‘NAs’ refers to the number of 
missing observations. ‘T-stat’ is the t-statistics and ‘SE Mean’ is the standard error of 
the mean. ‘LCL Mean’ is the lower confidence level of the mean and ‘UCL Mean’ is 
the upper confidence level of the mean. ‘VaR’ is the Value-at-Risk. The ‘SSEW’ 
strategy consists of an equally weighted position each month in the individual-
maturity swap spread strategies. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the monthly percentage excess returns from the swap spread arbitrage strategies for the sample period from November 1988 to 
December 2004 with CMS data from Bloomberg
TM
. 
  Risk_free SS2 SS3 SS5 SS7 SS10 SSEW 
Observations 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 
NAs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.0088 -0.1195 -0.2060 -0.2884 -0.2224 -0.1740 -0.1862 
Quartile 1 0.0300 -0.0388 -0.0248 -0.0217 -0.0069 -0.0032 -0.0172 
Median 0.0489 -0.0141 0.0000 -0.0065 0.0015 0.0031 -0.0057 
Arithmetic Mean 0.0440 -0.0229 -0.0058 -0.0097 0.0093 0.0140 -0.0030 
t-stat for the Arithmetic Mean 30.246 -11.0599 -2.8123 -4.6873 4.4655 6.7368 -1.7482 
Geometric Mean 0.0438 -0.0234 -0.0063 -0.0102 0.0088 0.0135 -0.0034 
Quartile 3 0.0553 0.0000 0.0203 0.0098 0.0319 0.0395 0.0173 
Maximum 0.0882 0.0413 0.0316 0.0198 0.0549 0.0615 0.0331 
SE Mean 0.0015 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0017 
LCL Mean (0.95) 0.0411 -0.0270 -0.0099 -0.0138 0.0052 0.0099 -0.0065 
UCL Mean (0.95) 0.0469 -0.0188 -0.0017 -0.0056 0.0133 0.0181 0.0004 
Variance 0.0004 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 
Stdev 0.0203 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0243 
Skewness -0.0138 -0.9770 -1.8956 -4.8495 -2.5674 -1.3346 -2.2784 
Kurtosis -0.6379 0.5611 10.0630 42.6029 19.3850 7.7016 14.7989 
Maximum Drawdown   0.9898 0.8623 0.8947 0.3797 0.3297 0.7335 
Historical VaR (95%)   -0.0776 -0.0473 -0.0476 -0.0243 -0.0190 -0.0347 
Historical CVaR (95%)   -0.0949 -0.0710 -0.0804 -0.0529 -0.0480 -0.0597 
Modified VaR (95%)   -0.0775 -0.0609 -0.0591 -0.0443 -0.0389 -0.0490 
Modified CVaR (95%)   -0.0905 -0.1379 -0.0591 -0.1572 -0.1051 -0.1324 
Sharpe Ratio (Rf= 4,4%)   -0,0079 -0,1316 -0,1656 -0,1692 -0,1471 -0,1548 
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the monthly percentage excess returns from the swap spread arbitrage strategies for the sample period from November 1988 to 
December 2011 with CMS data from Bloomberg
TM
. 
  Risk_free SS2 SS3 SS5 SS7 SS10 SSEW 
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 
NAs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.0001 -0.1196 -0.0731 -0.1917 -0.1084 -0.1435 -0.0913 
Quartile 1 0.0166 -0.0349 -0.0192 -0.0217 -0.0064 -0.0028 -0.0155 
Median 0.0411 -0.0075 0.0000 0.0000 0.0085 0.0179 0.0020 
Arithmetic Mean 0.0367 -0.0174 -0.0005 -0.0072 0.0156 0.0193 0.0020 
t-stat for the Arithmetic Mean 26.729 -10.0735 -0.289 -4,1526 9.0201 11.1459 1.3629 
Geometric Mean 0.0365 -0.0179 -0.0009 -0.0076 0.0152 0.0189 0.0017 
Quartile 3 0.0509 0.0000 0.0247 0.0149 0.0432 0.0435 0.0242 
Maximum 0.0882 0.0720 0.0463 0.0311 0.0651 0.0685 0.0389 
SE Mean 0.0014 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0014 
LCL Mean (0.95) 0.0340 -0.0208 -0.0039 -0.0106 0.0122 0.0159 -0.0009 
UCL Mean (0.95) 0.0394 -0.0140 0.0029 -0.0038 0.0190 0.0227 0.0048 
Variance 0.0005 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 
Stdev 0.0229 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0239 
Skewness -0.0043 -0.8260 -0.5161 -1.5661 -0.2771 -0.7324 -0.5139 
Kurtosis -0.8255 1.2622 -0.6240 5.5830 -0.0322 2.3692 -0.0735 
Maximum Drawdown   0.9952 0.9171 0.9581 0.4516 0.3433 0.7995 
Historical VaR (95%)   -0.0746 -0.0542 -0.0604 -0.0229 -0.0185 -0.0360 
Historical CVaR (95%)   -0.0911 -0.0626 -0.0806 -0.0400 -0.0399 -0.0505 
Modified VaR (95%)   -0.0705 -0.0524 -0.0629 -0.0340 -0.0324 -0.0408 
Modified CVaR (95%)   -0.0920 -0.0607 -0.1107 -0.0475 -0.0630 -0.0514 
Sharpe Ratio (Rf=3,67%)   0,0067 0,0112 -0,0793 -0,0725 -0,1009 -0,0597 
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the monthly percentage excess returns from the swap spread arbitrage strategies for the sample period from November 1988 to 
December 2004 with CMS data from Thompson Reuters Datastream™. 
  Risk_free SS2 SS3 SS5 SS7 SS10 SSEW 
Observations 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 
NAs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.0088 -0.1126 -0.2022 -0.2888 -0.1905 -0.1731 -0.1789 
Quartile 1 0.0300 -0.0403 -0.0234 -0.0196 -0.0064 -0.0015 -0.0154 
Median 0.0489 -0.0186 0.0000 -0.0054 0.0011 0.0037 -0.0058 
Arithmetic Mean 0.0440 -0.0244 -0.0049 -0.0086 0.0111 0.0152 -0.0023 
t-stat for the Arithmetic Mean 30.246 -11.7578 -2.3753 -4.162 5.3354 7.3418 -1.3589 
Geometric Mean 0.0438 -0.0248 -0.0054 -0.0091 0.0106 0.0148 -0.0026 
Quartile 3 0.0553 0.0000 0.0209 0.0101 0.0358 0.0406 0.0179 
Maximum 0.0882 0.0391 0.0329 0.0201 0.0581 0.0635 0.0348 
SE Mean 0.0015 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0017 
LCL Mean (0.95) 0.0411 -0.0285 -0.0090 -0.0127 0.0070 0.0111 -0.0057 
UCL Mean (0.95) 0.0469 -0.0203 -0.0008 -0.0045 0.0151 0.0193 0.0011 
Variance 0.0004 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 
Stdev 0.0203 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0239 
Skewness -0.0138 -0.8974 -1.8814 -4.9415 -1.6281 -1.2485 -2.1476 
Kurtosis -0.6379 0.2243 9.5747 43.5990 10.3484 7.5237 13.7281 
Maximum Drawdown   0.9923 0.8429 0.8754 0.4057 0.3350 0.7093 
Historical VaR (95%)   -0.0823 -0.0486 -0.0460 -0.0245 -0.0215 -0.0347 
Historical CVaR (95%)   -0.0959 -0.0737 -0.0806 -0.0498 -0.0450 -0.0582 
Modified VaR (95%)   -0.0785 -0.0602 -0.0577 -0.0422 -0.0372 -0.0474 
Modified CVaR (95%)   -0.0897 -0.1340 -0.0577 -0.1234 -0.1021 -0.1264 
Sharpe Ratio (Rf= 4,4%)   0,0029 -0,1239 -0,1671 -0,1615 -0,1567 -0,1466 
56 
Table 4: Summary statistics for the monthly percentage excess returns from the swap spread arbitrage strategies for the sample period from November 1988 to 
December 2011 with CMS data from Thompson Reuters Datastream™. 
  Risk_free SS2 SS3 SS5 SS7 SS10 SSEW 
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 
NAs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.0001 -0.1106 -0.0822 -0.1875 -0.1104 -0.1435 -0.0908 
Quartile 1 0.0166 -0.0364 -0.0195 -0.0226 -0.0052 -0.0013 -0.0147 
Median 0.0411 -0.0094 0.0000 0.0000 0.0215 0.0195 0.0032 
Arithmetic Mean 0.0367 -0.0190 0.0009 -0.0052 0.0184 0.0204 0.0031 
t-stat for the Arithmetic Mean 26.729 -10.9651 0.5214 -3.0161 10.65 11.7544 2.1875 
Geometric Mean 0.0365 -0.0194 0.0005 -0.0057 0.0180 0.0199 0.0028 
Quartile 3 0.0509 0.0000 0.0276 0.0194 0.0453 0.0432 0.0247 
Maximum 0.0882 0.0754 0.0455 0.0387 0.0663 0.0711 0.0403 
SE Mean 0.0014 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0014 
LCL Mean (0.95) 0.0340 -0.0224 -0.0025 -0.0086 0.0150 0.0169 0.0003 
UCL Mean (0.95) 0.0394 -0.0156 0.0043 -0.0018 0.0218 0.0238 0.0059 
Variance 0.0005 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 
Stdev 0.0229 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0236 
Skewness -0.0043 -0.7063 -0.4785 -1.4547 -0.4150 -0.6396 -0.4822 
Kurtosis -0.8255 1.0259 -0.5478 5.3438 -0.0215 2.1637 -0.0104 
Maximum Drawdown   0.9966 0.8945 0.9423 0.4329 0.3499 0.7680 
Historical VaR (95%)   -0.0762 -0.0494 -0.0539 -0.0233 -0.0193 -0.0357 
Historical CVaR (95%)   -0.0923 -0.0619 -0.0779 -0.0389 -0.0377 -0.0483 
Modified VaR (95%)   -0.0713 -0.0506 -0.0603 -0.0323 -0.0308 -0.0388 
Modified CVaR (95%)   -0.0918 -0.0599 -0.1082 -0.0459 -0.0599 -0.0498 
Sharpe Ratio (Rf=3,67%)   0,0152 0,0182 -0,0789 -0,0827 -0,1101 -0,0547 
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Appendix 6 – Summary statistics for yield curve arbitrage strategy 
For all tables on appendix 6, the following applies: 
‘Observations’ refer to the number of observations. ‘NAs’ refers to the number of 
missing observations. ‘T-stat’ is the t-statistics and ‘SE Mean’ is the standard error of 
the mean. ‘LCL Mean’ is the lower confidence level of the mean and ‘UCL Mean’ is 
the upper confidence level of the mean. ‘VaR’ is the Value-at-Risk. The ‘YCEW’ 
strategy consists of an equally weighted position each month in the individual-
maturity yield curve strategies. 
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Table 5: Summary statistics for the monthly percentage excess returns from the yield curve arbitrage strategies for the sample period from November 1988 to 
December 2004 with CMS data from Bloomberg
TM
. 
  Risk_free YC2 YC3 YC5 YC7 YCEW 
Observations 194 194 194 194 194 194 
NAs 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.0088 -0.1116 -0.1302 -0.0291 -0.0053 -0.0280 
Quartile 1 0.0300 0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0008 -0.0018 0.0029 
Median 0.0489 0.0000 0.0152 0.0314 0.0105 0.0161 
Arithmetic Mean 0.0440 0.0108 0.0203 0.0266 0.0222 0.0160 
t-stat for the Arithmetic Mean 30.246 5.2121 9.8087 12.8225 10.7092 13.0298 
Geometric Mean 0.0438 0.0104 0.0199 0.0262 0.0218 0.0158 
Quartile 3 0.0553 0.0303 0.0410 0.0401 0.0396 0.0270 
Maximum 0.0882 0.0923 0.1068 0.1341 0.1296 0.0699 
SE Mean 0.0015 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0012 
LCL Mean (0.95) 0.0411 0.0067 0.0162 0.0225 0.0181 0.0136 
UCL Mean (0.95) 0.0469 0.0149 0.0244 0.0307 0.0263 0.0184 
Variance 0.0004 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0003 
Stdev 0.0203 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0171 
Skewness -0.0138 -0.9667 -0.4418 0.9235 1.1884 0.0552 
Kurtosis -0.6379 3.6116 2.8647 1.2631 1.3443 0.0952 
Maximum Drawdown   0.4571 0.1973 0.0968 0.0403 0.0981 
Historical VaR (95%)   -0.0221 -0.0175 -0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0123 
Historical CVaR (95%)   -0.0735 -0.0365 -0.0124 -0.0050 -0.0191 
Modified VaR (95%)   -0.0419 -0.0289 -0.0119 -0.0138 -0.0117 
Modified CVaR (95%)   -0.0812 -0.0604 -0.0209 -0.0295 -0.0189 
Sharpe Ratio (Rf=4,4%)   -0,0053 -0,0018 -0,0012 -0,0012 -0,0048 
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Table 6: Summary statistics for the monthly percentage excess returns from the yield curve arbitrage strategies for the sample period from November 1988 to 
December 2011 with CMS data from Bloomberg
TM
. 
  Risk_free YC2 YC3 YC5 YC7 YCEW 
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278 
NAs 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.0001 -0.1251 -0.1395 -0.0365 -0.0056 -0.0315 
Quartile 1 0.0166 0.0000 -0.0013 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0051 
Median 0.0411 0.0081 0.0169 0.0233 0.0116 0.0156 
Arithmetic Mean 0.0367 0.0125 0.0208 0.0261 0.0219 0.0163 
t-stat for the Arithmetic Mean 26.729 7.2296 12.0268 15.097 12.6294 15.6153 
Geometric Mean 0.0365 0.0121 0.0204 0.0257 0.0215 0.0161 
Quartile 3 0.0509 0.0282 0.0407 0.0420 0.0398 0.0283 
Maximum 0.0882 0.1051 0.1164 0.1427 0.1377 0.0764 
SE Mean 0.0014 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0010 
LCL Mean (0.95) 0.0340 0.0091 0.0174 0.0227 0.0185 0.0142 
UCL Mean (0.95) 0.0394 0.0159 0.0242 0.0295 0.0253 0.0183 
Variance 0.0005 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0003 
Stdev 0.0229 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0174 
Skewness -0.0043 -0.9475 -0.2073 1.0841 1.3330 0.2692 
Kurtosis -0.8255 4.9522 3.2014 1.6547 1.6877 0.4364 
Maximum Drawdown   0.4991 0.2111 0.1201 0.0432 0.1087 
Historical VaR (95%)   -0.0234 -0.0049 -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0095 
Historical CVaR (95%)   -0.0679 -0.0341 -0.0120 -0.0051 -0.0195 
Modified VaR (95%)   -0.0393 -0.0264 -0.0107 -0.0126 -0.0107 
Modified CVaR (95%)   -0.0875 -0.0546 -0.0221 -0.0342 -0.0173 
Sharpe Ratio (Rf=3,67%)   -0,0036 -0,0012 -0,0009 -0,0008 -0,0035 
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Table 7: Summary statistics for the monthly percentage excess returns from the yield curve arbitrage strategies for the sample period from November 1988 to 
December 2004 with CMS data from Thompson Reuters Datastream™. 
  Risk_free YC2 YC3 YC5 YC7 YCEW 
Observations 194 194 194 194 194 194 
NAs 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.0088 -0.1157 -0.0681 -0.0283 -0.0051 -0.0251 
Quartile 1 0.0300 0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0002 -0.0017 0.0063 
Median 0.0489 0.0000 0.0167 0.0304 0.0123 0.0207 
Arithmetic Mean 0.0440 0.0105 0.0235 0.0276 0.0230 0.0169 
t-stat for the Arithmetic Mean 30.246 5.0897 11.3466 13.3318 11.081 14.3289 
Geometric Mean 0.0438 0.0101 0.0231 0.0272 0.0226 0.0168 
Quartile 3 0.0553 0.0303 0.0446 0.0386 0.0380 0.0276 
Maximum 0.0882 0.0952 0.1171 0.1364 0.1379 0.0770 
SE Mean 0.0015 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0012 
LCL Mean (0.95) 0.0411 0.0065 0.0194 0.0235 0.0189 0.0146 
UCL Mean (0.95) 0.0469 0.0146 0.0276 0.0317 0.0271 0.0193 
Variance 0.0004 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0003 
Stdev 0.0203 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0165 
Skewness -0.0138 -0.9709 0.2860 1.0829 1.3140 -0.0644 
Kurtosis -0.6379 3.7503 -0.2226 1.8509 1.9477 0.3060 
Maximum Drawdown   0.4222 0.1693 0.0941 0.0412 0.0813 
Historical VaR (95%)   -0.0198 -0.0051 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0123 
Historical CVaR (95%)   -0.0727 -0.0250 -0.0120 -0.0047 -0.0179 
Modified VaR (95%)   -0.0421 -0.0216 -0.0090 -0.0114 -0.0103 
Modified CVaR (95%)   -0.0824 -0.0304 -0.0199 -0.0312 -0.0184 
Sharpe Ratio (Rf=3,67%)   -0,0057 -0,0017 -0,0703 -0,0012 -0,0369 
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Table 8: Summary statistics for the monthly percentage excess returns from the yield curve arbitrage strategies for the sample period from November 1988 to 
December 2011 with CMS data from Thompson Reuters Datastream™. 
  Risk_free YC2 YC3 YC5 YC7 YCEW 
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278 
NAs 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.0001 -0.1299 -0.0881 -0.0358 -0.0054 -0.0333 
Quartile 1 0.0166 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0054 -0.0006 0.0054 
Median 0.0411 0.0082 0.0187 0.0221 0.0130 0.0168 
Arithmetic Mean 0.0367 0.0123 0.0233 0.0267 0.0227 0.0170 
t-stat for the Arithmetic Mean 26.729 7.1063 13.478 15.4427 13.1237 16.846 
Geometric Mean 0.0365 0.0119 0.0229 0.0263 0.0223 0.0169 
Quartile 3 0.0509 0.0255 0.0442 0.0413 0.0401 0.0288 
Maximum 0.0882 0.1086 0.1256 0.1461 0.1467 0.0843 
SE Mean 0.0014 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0010 
LCL Mean (0.95) 0.0340 0.0089 0.0199 0.0233 0.0193 0.0150 
UCL Mean (0.95) 0.0394 0.0157 0.0267 0.0301 0.0261 0.0190 
Variance 0.0005 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0003 
Stdev 0.0229 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0289 0.0168 
Skewness -0.0043 -1.0199 0.4456 1.2422 1.4342 0.1434 
Kurtosis -0.8255 5.2705 0.5047 2.3791 2.3482 0.5609 
Maximum Drawdown   0.4630 0.2074 0.1180 0.0448 0.1031 
Historical VaR (95%)   -0.0238 -0.0050 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0099 
Historical CVaR (95%)   -0.0682 -0.0240 -0.0118 -0.0049 -0.0190 
Modified VaR (95%)   -0.0398 -0.0200 -0.0082 -0.0104 -0.0097 
Modified CVaR (95%)   -0.0903 -0.0292 -0.0229 -0.0358 -0.0173 
Sharpe Ratio (Rf=3,67%)   -0,0039 -0,0011 -0,0558 -0,0009 -0,0280 
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Appendix 7 – Linear regression analysis for swap spread arbitrage strategy (until 2004) 
Table 9: SS linear regression analysis (until 2004) 
t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est.
Alpha 0,9820 0,4005 0,3932 -12,7220 0,4338 -5,5185 -8,6200 0,5574 -4,8044 -4,8480 0,6671 -3,2344 -3,9730 0,5861 -2,3287 -5,1390 0,6909 -3,5502
MSUSAM -2,4890 0,0034 -0,0085
MSWXUS
MSEMKF 2,3080 0,0021 0,0049
USMGUSRI -2,0370 0,0103 -0,0210 2,3680 0,0298 0,0706
USMGEXRI
ECUSD1M -9,0600 0,0728 -0,6593
GOLDBLN
TWEXMMTH
CREDITaaa 12,3490 0,1241 1,5320 4,3430 0,8111 3,5228 4,9640 0,7207 3,5773 8,1300 0,1443 1,1733
CREDITbaa 7,2850 0,1351 0,9841 -2,3900 0,7541 -1,8023 -2,7150 0,6779 -1,8405
TED -2,2350 0,6376 -1,4250
TERM -2,4230 0,0134 -0,0326
VALGRTH
SMLG
MOM
VIX
INF 2,9050 0,1910 0,5550
FINANCE 5,6880 0,6815 3,8767 3,2670 0,5439 1,7770
Multiple R
2
0,3842 0,4445 0,2165 0,4885 0,5878 0,5135
Adjsusted R
2
0,3744 0,4386 0,2125 0,4777 0,5791 0,5059
EWSS
Linear Regression 
Factors
SS2 SS3 SS5 SS7 SS10
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Appendix 8 – Linear regression analysis for yield curve arbitrage strategy (until 2004) 
Table 10: YC linear regression analysis (until 2004) 
t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est.
Alpha -3,4700 2,1851 -7,5834 -2,1230 2,3488 -4,9875 5,8630 0,8674 5,0856 5,7580 0,8452 4,8667 -1,1560 1,3624 -1,5753
MSUSAM 2,5970 0,0051 0,0133 2,0370 0,0029 0,0058
MSWXUS
MSEMKF
USMGUSRI 3,3850 0,0371 0,1257 2,7270 0,0405 0,1104 4,1310 0,0378 0,1561 4,1150 0,0376 0,1549 4,7470 0,0228 0,1084
USMGEXRI
ECUSD1M 3,6230 0,2900 1,0507 3,3110 0,3096 1,0251 3,1770 0,1747 0,5549
GOLDBLN 2,6660 0,0044 0,0118
TWEXMMTH
CREDITaaa 4,4930 0,3697 1,6610 2,7400 0,3970 1,0879 2,2520 1,0290 2,3179 4,1660 1,0143 4,2255 2,7500 0,6732 1,8515
CREDITbaa -2,7310 0,9562 -2,6116 -4,4890 0,9434 -4,2354 -2,0410 0,5960 -1,2165
TED -4,2220 1,4725 -6,2166 -3,5210 1,5678 -5,5197 -3,3090 0,9302 -3,0782
TERM -2,9660 0,0168 -0,0498 -2,3300 0,0183 -0,0427 -4,0310 0,0170 -0,0687 -4,0070 0,0169 -0,0679 -4,4010 0,0103 -0,0454
VALGRTH -2,0640 0,0179 -0,0369
SMLG -2,1610 0,0192 -0,0416
MOM
VIX 2,4240 0,0013 0,0031 2,3620 0,0007 0,0017
INF -2,6170 0,3059 -0,8005 -2,3590 0,3331 -0,7858 -2,5130 0,2339 -0,5878 -3,1370 0,1880 -0,5897
FINANCE 3,8830 1,4334 5,5662 2,7540 1,5185 4,1825 3,2470 0,8780 2,8511
Multiple R
2
0,2626 0,1715 0,1819 0,2045 0,2675
Adjsusted R
2
0,2265 0,1310 0,1602 0,1834 0,2274
YCEW
Linear Regression 
Factors
YC2 YC3 YC5 YC7
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Appendix 9 – Linear regression analysis for swap spread arbitrage strategy (until 2011) 
Table 11: SS linear regression analysis (until 2011) 
t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est.
Alpha -0,2020 0,2720 -0,0548 -0,6040 0,8025 -0,4849 0,3500 0,8563 0,2996 1,7290 0,6381 1,1033 5,2050 0,9045 4,7080 0,0660 0,5897 0,0390
MSUSAM -3,5500 0,0028 -0,0101 -3,5720 0,0024 -0,0087 -3,7290 0,0028 -0,0106 -3,4580 0,0021 -0,0072
MSWXUS
MSEMKF 2,3150 0,0018 0,0041 3,0330 0,0018 0,0054 4,3680 0,0015 0,0066 3,9780 0,0018 0,0071 3,8810 0,0013 0,0050
USMGUSRI
USMGEXRI
ECUSD1M -12,1820 0,0518 -0,6315 -4,3130 0,0940 -0,4054 -5,6240 0,0943 -0,5303 -4,8090 0,0693 -0,3334 -5,5130 0,0969 -0,5341 -5,2010 0,0691 -0,3592
GOLDBLN 2,6000 0,0026 0,0067
TWEXMMTH
CREDITaaa 5,2160 0,1483 0,7738 2,2560 0,1590 0,3587 6,2090 0,3805 2,3627 3,3960 0,4441 1,5082 6,0610 0,1090 0,6607
CREDITbaa -3,5530 0,3464 -1,2307 -2,4870 0,4060 -1,0097
TED -3,6780 0,4106 -1,5104 -3,5410 0,2783 -0,9854 -4,4040 0,3423 -1,5076 -5,2620 0,3018 -1,5880
TERM
VALGRTH
SMLG
MOM
VIX 2,3750 0,0007 0,0016
INF -3,1940 0,1176 -0,3756
FINANCE 8,7290 0,3654 3,1890 3,6500 0,5628 2,0541 4,0610 0,4136 1,6795
Multiple R
2
0,4641 0,6161 0,4065 0,7238 0,6261 0,6985
Adjsusted R
2
0,4562 0,6076 0,4000 0,7177 0,6165 0,6918
Linear Regression 
Factors
EWSSSS2 SS3 SS5 SS7 SS10
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Appendix 10 – Linear regression analysis for yield curve arbitrage strategy (until 2011) 
Table 12: YC linear regression analysis (until 2011) 
t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est. t-stat std.err est.
Alpha -2,2940 1,4044 -3,2215 8,0220 0,2574 2,0651 9,9310 0,4772 4,7393 8,5900 0,4988 4,2851 5,6100 0,2323 1,3034
MSUSAM
MSWXUS
MSEMKF
USMGUSRI 2,7740 0,0243 0,0675 3,2440 0,0236 0,0764 3,2410 0,0225 0,0729 3,2000 0,0228 0,0731 3,0540 0,0150 0,0458
USMGEXRI 2,1030 0,0035 0,0074
ECUSD1M 2,3590 0,1645 0,3881 3,0670 0,0456 0,1397
GOLDBLN 2,1390 0,0030 0,0065
TWEXMMTH
CREDITaaa 2,8760 0,5259 1,5125
CREDITbaa 3,6880 0,2199 0,8109 -5,1580 0,0963 -0,4967 -3,8470 0,4549 -1,7499
TED -4,0370 0,7362 -2,9719 -3,7840 0,3256 -1,2319
TERM -2,1260 0,0093 -0,0197 -2,5640 0,0090 -0,0230 -2,9550 0,0086 -0,0253 -2,9280 0,0087 -0,0254 -2,9420 0,0054 -0,0159
VALGRTH
SMLG
MOM
VIX
INF -3,0550 0,1496 -0,4570 -3,8850 0,1403 -0,5452 -3,1970 0,1600 -0,5117 -3,5990 0,1024 -0,3686
FINANCE 3,3460 0,9083 3,0395 2,3980 0,5421 1,2998 3,6540 0,4733 1,7290
Multiple R
2
0,1123 0,07314 0,1877 0,1892 0,1849
Adjsusted R
2
0,0926 0,0630 0,1757 0,1682 0,1638
YCEW
Linear Regression 
Factors
YC2 YC3 YC5 YC7
 
